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Individualismand Evolutionary
Psychology (or: In Defense
of "Narrow" Functions)*
David J. Bullertt
Departmentof Philosophy,NorthernIllinoisUniversity

Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, for differentreasons, that the essential reference to the environmentin adaptationistexplanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualisminconsistentwith evolutionarypsychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretationsof the role of referenceto the environmentin
such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations,I develop an account of explanation in evolutionarypsychology that is fully consistent with individualism.This
does not, however,constitutea full-fledgeddefenseof individualism,sinceevolutionary
psychology is only one explanatoryparadigmamong many in psychology.

1. Introduction.Psychologicalindividualismis the principlethat an individual'spsychological states superveneon that individual's(current)
internal physical states. Although individualismcan appear to be an
ontological thesis, it is actually a methodological constraint on psychological explanation deriving from a commitment to causal explanations of behavior. The idea is this. Conditions in an individual's
external environment either have had an effect on that individual's
internal states or have not. If they have not, they could not have had
an effect on the behavior produced by that individual;so they are ex*ReceivedJuly 1995;revisedNovember 1995.
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planatorilyirrelevant.If they have, then their effect on the individual's
behaviorhas been mediatedby theireffect on internalstates.However,
since precisely how external conditions affect internal states is partly
determinedby the currentglobal economy of an individual'sinternal
states, the same external conditions may have differenteffects on the
internal states of different individuals (or the same individual at different times). So it is not the externalconditions that explainbehavior,
but ratherthe internalstates they affect. Consequently,even if external
conditions have affectedinternalstates, referenceto those externalconditions is explanatorily uninformative. Either way, then, a complete
causal explanation of an individual's behavior cites only states that
superveneon that individual'sinternalphysical states.
Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, on differentgrounds,that
individualism is inconsistent with explanation in evolutionary psychology. Theirreasonsstem from the fact that evolutionarypsychology
appears to explain behavior as the product of evolution by natural
selection. This, in turn, appearsto involve viewing some given type of
behavior or behavioral pattern as an adaptation-a heritablephenotypic character that, within the particularenvironmentprevailingat
some point in the evolutionaryhistoryof a species,conferreda selective
advantage on individuals exhibiting it. Both Millikan and Wilson, in
differentways, take this essentialreferenceto the environmentto make
adaptationistaccounts of behavior inconsistentwith individualism.
In what follows, I will show that their argumentsare based on misunderstandingsof the explanatoryrole of referenceto the environment
and that, consequently,explanationin evolutionarypsychologyis fully
consistentwith individualism.I do not, however,intendthis as a defense
of individualism.For I believein the disunityof psychology:Psychology
is not the monomorphicenterprisethat philosophicaltalk of "thenature
of psychologicalexplanation"implies, but is a motley of researchprogramswith differingexplanatorygoals. Thus, showingthat one research
program within psychology is individualisticdoes not show that all
forms of psychological explanation are. My goal, rather, is merely to
elucidatethe natureof explanationin evolutionarypsychology.1
2. "EvolutionaryExplanationsof Behavior"?Wilson arguessimplythat
"evolutionaryexplanations of behavior" typically cite "the pressures
1. I will discuss only psychologicalexplanationsbased on traditionalneo-Darwinism,
not explanationsbased on developmentalsystems theory(see, e.g., Griffithsand Gray
1994);for the overwhelmingmajorityof work in evolutionarypsychology is based on
neo-Darwinianevolutionarytheory, and it is not yet clearpreciselyhow developmental
systemstheory will lead to a differentform of psychologicalexplanation.
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of selection causally responsiblefor the existenceof a given behavior."
Such explanations are inconsistent with individualism,he concludes,
"since selection pressuresdo not supervene on the intrinsic, physical
propertiesof individuals"(1994, 59-60). This argumentfails for three
reasons, discussion of which will serve to focus the issues.
First, selection pressuresare not "causallyresponsiblefor the existence" of any phenotypictraits, includingbehaviors.Evolution by natural selection involves two processes,repeatingevery generation:(1) a
process that produces heritablephenotypic variation and (2) the process of selection, which "winnows" that variation through "environmental demands" (Amundson 1994, 570; Mayr 1988, 98). Process (1)
itself involves two subprocesses:reproduction,whereingenes are transmitted from individuals in one generation to those in the next, and
development,wherein the genome of each individual in the new generation (epigenetically)producesits phenome. Selectionpressuresonly
enter into process (2) as the environmentaldemands that winnow the
variationalreadyproducedin process (1). In winnowingthat variation,
selection alters the frequenciesof the genes availableto be transmitted
through reproduction.This, in turn, alters the frequenciesof the types
of developmentalprocess that will occur in the next generation and,
hence, the frequenciesof the phenotypic charactersproducedby those
developmentalprocesses. Thus, selection is only a cause of changesin
the frequencies of phenotypic traits in some population; it does not
causally produce any phenotypic traits of individuals in that population (Cummins 1975, 750-751; Endler 1986, 46 and 241; Maynard
Smith 1993, 20; Mayr 1988, 98; Sober 1984, 149-152).
Contrary to Wilson's interpretation,when evolutionary psychologists speak of explainingthe "existence"of a behavior, they are referring to reconstructingthe history of cumulativemodificationsto previous characters that culminated in the current form of behavior
(Alcock 1993, 1-6). Thus, such "existence"explanations account for
the genealogy, not the etiology, of some behaviors.And the modifications cited in them also are not caused by selection;they are (typically)
caused by mutation and then persist because of being selected.
Neander (1995b), however, argues that such cumulative evolution
(via cumulative selection of "gene sequences")shows that selection is
a cause of an individual's phenotypic traits. Neander's argument is
clearest if we consider a simple example of a hypothetical species of
haploid, uniparentalorganisms.Supposethat all individualsin the current generation of this species have the gene sequence (A2,B2,C2),
which has evolved from (A1,B1,C1) through successivemutations (Al
to A2, etc.), where selection so strongly favored each new sequence
that it was drivento fixationgenerationsbeforeanothermutation.Sup-
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pose further that the sequence (A2,B2,C2) produces (during normal
development)the phenotypic trait T. Thus, to explain why an individual, S, in the currentgenerationpossesses T, we would cite the developmental process by which (A2,B2,C2) produces T. But Neander argues that we could provide a more complete causal explanation by
citing the reproductiveprocess by which S inherited(A2,B2,C2) from
its parent. An even more complete causal explanation, she argues,
would trace the chain of inheritanceof (A2,B2,C2) back through S's
lineage. Eventually,however, we will have to explain the causal origin
of the (A2,B2,C2) sequence,with some individualZ, by citing the fact
that C1 mutated to C2. But, Neander argues,mutation is only part of
the causal explanation of the origin of (A2,B2,C2). The other part of
the explanation involves selection, since (A2,B2,C2) would not have
arisen by mutation of C1 to C2 with Z unless there had been prior
selection for (A2,B2,C1). If only (A2,B1,C1) had been availablein the
generation before Z, the production of (A2,B2,C2) would have required the mutation of B1 to B2 in addition to Cl to C2. Since the
probabilityof two mutations occurringis much smallerthan the probability of only one, the fact that selection drove (A2,B2,C1) to fixation
by the generation before Z-as opposed to favoring (A2,B1,C1) or
favoring neither over the other-greatly increasedthe probabilitythat
(A2,B2,C2) would occur. (Similarly, the probability increased when
there was selection for the A2 mutation.) The fact that selection thus
increased the probability that (A2,B2,C2) would occur, Neander argues, shows that it is a causal factor in the origin of the (A2,B2,C2)
sequenceand, hence, that it is a historicalcause of S's possessing T.
But the fact that selection for (A2,B2,C1) increasedthe probability
that (A2,B2,C2) would occur is in fact not relevant to explaining S's
possessingT. For selectiondid not make it more probablethat Zwould
have (A2,B2,C2), ratherthansome otherindividualin Z's generationor
a subsequentgeneration.Selectionfor (A2,B2,C1)thus did not increase
the probability that Z wouldhave the (A2,B2,C2) sequence.And, if it
is supposedto be selection'sincreasingthe probabilityof an occurrence
that implicates selection in the causation of that occurrence (as per
Neander's argument),selection for (A2,B2,C1) was not a cause of Z's
having (A2,B2,C2).An explanationof how Z came to have (A2,B2,C2)
need thus cite only the fact that Z's parent had (A2,B2,C1) and that
therewas mutation of Cl to C2 in the productionof Z. (Neanderwould
arguethat selectionwas a cause of Z's parent'shaving (A2,B2,C1);but
my counterargument,mutatis mutandis,would again apply.) If selection was not a cause of Z's having (A2,B2,C2), however, it was not
among the historicalcauses of S's having T. Only if selectionincreased
the probabilitythat (A2,B2,C2) would occur in S's lineage,ratherthan
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elsewhere,would it be a cause of S's possessingT; for, had (A2,B2,C2)
originatedwith an individualnot in S's lineage, S would not have inherited that sequence and, hence, would not possess T. In short, the
increasedprobabilitythat (A2,B2,C2) would occur was strictlya population level increase and did not increase the probability that any
particularindividualin that population would have (A2,B2,C2). Thus,
selection is not a cause of any particularindividual'sphenotypictraits.
(See Sober 1995 for furtherrelatedcriticismsof Neander's position.)
Returningto Wilson's argument,the secondproblemis that not only
does selection not causally produce behaviors,strictlyspeakingit does
not selectfor behaviors either. For there is only selection for heritable
phenotypiccharacters(Sober 1984, 151);and it is not behaviors,but the
dispositions and abilities to perform them, that are inherited.For example, a gazelle has not failed to inheritthe stotting responseif it fortuitously goes through life without ever spotting a predator;thus, it is
not stotting itself, but the dispositionto stott when a predatoris spotted,
that is inherited.Dispositions and abilities,however,cannotbe inherited
apartfrom mechanismsthat subservethem. Thus, strictlyspeaking,it is
mechanismsthat produce and control behaviorthat are selectedforwhat are standardlycalled "proximatemechanisms."To put this another way, since it is genes that are transmittedfrom one generationto
the next, and genesjust build bodies, genes do not "codefor"behaviors,
but only for behaviorcontrolmechanisms(Dawkins 1995,57-58). Consequently,as Cosmides and Tooby say: "To speak of naturalselection
as selectingfor 'behaviors'is a convenientshorthand,but it is misleading
usage .... Natural selectioncannot selectfor behaviorper se;it can only
select for mechanisms that produce behavior" (1987, 281). So evolutionary psychology actually explains the evolution of proximatemechanisms.Behaviorsof interestto evolutionarypsychologistsare then explainedin terms of the functioningof these mechanisms.
Third, it is not the case that the only differencebetweenexplaining
the evolution of proximatemechanismsand explaininghow they function to produce behavior lies in the proximity to the behavior-that
the evolutionaryaccount explainswhat causallyproducesa proximate
mechanismand the latter account explains how that mechanismcausally produces the behavior-and that the evolutionary account thus
provides a distal causal explanation of the behavior. For proximate
mechanismsare also phenotypiccharacters.As such, selectionno more
causallyproducesthem than it causallyproducesany otherphenotypic
character.Consequently,selectionistexplanationsof proximatemechanisms do not provide even distal causal explanationsof behavior(cf.
Dretske 1988, 95).2
2. Wilson (pp. 73-74) endorses the possibility that evolutionarypsychology provides

This content downloaded from 131.156.224.067 on April 30, 2020 10:33:54 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

INDIVIDUALISM AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

79

These three points are significant.For individualismis a methodological constrainton causal explanationsof why particularindividuals
behave in particularways at particularpoints in time. To argue, then,
that evolutionarypsychology violates individualismby citing environmental selection pressuresis beside the point; for selection pressures
are not part of a causal explanation of behavior.The only causal explanations in which selection pressuresfeature are those of changing
frequenciesof types of proximate mechanismand, hence, of changing
frequencies of the types of behavior produced by those mechanisms
under certain conditions. These explanations are non-individualistic;
but, since they are not causal explanations of why individualsbehave
as they do, they fall outside the intended methodological purview of
individualism. In sum, an adaptationist account of how proximate
mechanismswere shapedconcernsonly howthey wereshaped;and they
can be shaped by non-individualisticprocesses, while the mechanisms
so shaped, and how they contribute to the causal production of behavior, may still be wholly individualisticphenomena.
There is, nonetheless, a point of contact between evolutionarypsychology and individualism.For evolutionarypsychology "involvesthe
exploration of the naturally selected 'design' features of the mechanisms that control behavior"(Tooby 1988, 67). In exploring these design features,evolutionarypsychology explains the adaptivestrategies
that proximatemechanismsserve,and this in turn "givesprecisemeaning to the concept of function for proximatemechanisms"(Cosmides
and Tooby 1987, 283). Thus, insofar as proximate mechanisms are
functional items (functioningto produce and control behavior),there
is a question about whether theirfunctions can be individuatedindividualistically.The issue, then, is not whetheran evolutionaryaccount
of proximate mechanisms cites non-individualisticphenomena; it is
whether that account forces a non-individualisticfunctionalindividuation of proximatemechanisms.
3. The Functionsof ProximateMechanisms.Millikancontends that the
functions of naturallyselectedproximatemechanismsare non-individualistic. Since her reasons are widely articulated (in 1984 and 1993,
with her objections to individualismbecoming focused in 1993, Chapters 7 and 8), I will present a brief rationallyreconstructedargument.
Dretskeanstructuringcausesof behavior.A Dretskeanstructuringcause bringsit about
that a particularinternalstate causes a particularmovementin an individual(Dretske
1988, 33-42). But, that some internal state causes some movement in an individual is as

phenotypica trait as anything.Consequently,selection does not satisfy Dretske'sconcept of a structuringcause, only development does (as Dretske argues, pp. 47 and
92-93).
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Millikan'sfirst premiseis a version of the etiological theoryoffunctions:a biological item I has as a (proper3)function the productionof
an effect E just in case having produced effects of type E in the past
caused the proliferationof items of type I(1984, 26; 1993, 13-14). Thus,
it is a function of a proximate mechanismto produce some effectjust
in case the production of that effect figuresin an account of why there
was selection for mechanismsof that type (1993, 35-39).
The second premiseis that proximatemechanismswere selectedbecause of their environmentallydistal effects. To illustratethis, consider
an example that Millikan frequentlyemploys. A chameleon possesses
a proximate mechanism, M, which produces the following series of
effects, runningfrom proximal to very distal: It (El) redistributespigments in the chameleon's skin, which (E2) makes the coloring of the
chameleon match its background, which (E3) makes the chameleon
virtually invisible, which (E4) makes the chameleon avoid predation.
Millikan contends that only E4 explains why there was selection for
Ms (in that any account that omitted referenceto E4 would be unable
to explain why Ms were selected). So it is a function of M to produce
E4. Of course, M produces E4 by producing El, which effects E2,
which effects E3, which effects E4. So the account of how production
of E4 brought about proliferationof Ms would also cite the production
of E1-E3 (although E1-E3 contributed to that proliferationonly by
effecting E4). Thus, production of each of these effects is a function of
M; indeed, the production of effects El-E4 are what Millikan calls
"serialfunctions" of M (1984, 35).
The final premise is that a proximate mechanism's production of
distal effects "almost invariably depends upon its having a suitable
surroundingenvironment"(1984, 30), where the more distal the effect
the more its production depends on the environment(1984, 35). This
can be seen in the steps from El to E4, where each step requiresthat
more environmentalconditions be in place. These environmentalconditions are what Millikancalls the "Normalconditions"withoutwhich
a proximate mechanism cannot perform its functions (1984, 33-34;
1993, 48 and 160). Since Normal conditions of the environment are
thus essential to proximate mechanisms' performing their functions,
Millikan concludes, "explainingthe operation of these mechanismsrequires describing the relations their operations normally bear to the
environment"(1993, 137).Thus, environmentalNormal conditionsare
essential to the functional individuationof proximatemechanisms.
3. Millikan's concept of a properfunction is intended to capture biological functions,
which are my focus here. I will use only 'function' for simplicity,however;for as will
become clear, my disagreementwith Millikan does not turn on terminology.
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Before critiquingthis view, let me clarify some points. First, undergirdingthe above argumentare two assumptionsthat I will accept and
employ:(1) that the function of a proximatemechanismis individuated
individualisticallyjust in case the output that it is the function of the
mechanism to produce is itself an individualisticitem, and (2) that a
behavioral output is individualisticjust in case it is describedin a way
that is insensitive to how that behavioral output is embedded in the
environment.Very roughly, (2) circumscribesas individualisticthose
descriptionsof behavior that characterizean organism'sproximal responses. These assumptionsconjointly entail the following criterion:A
proximatemechanismis individuatedindividualisticallyjust in case the
function of that mechanismis to produce a proximal response.
Second, I will also assume a fairly standardversion of the etiological
theory of functions (see the first premise).My disagreementwith Millikan will not be over this theory. Rather, I will argue that the second
premiseis faulty and that, contraryto what Millikan assumes, the etiological theory of functions lends it no support.
Third, according to Millikan's conception of the "serialfunctions"
of a mechanism, the mechanism has as functions to produce earlier
items in the series because only by producing them does it succeed in
producing the terminalitem in the series (on which selection acts). In
addition, earlieritems in the seriesfunction to producelater items, but
their having these functionalrelationsderivesfrom the functions of the
mechanism that produces the series. Returning to the chameleon example, accordingto Millikanpigmentredistribution(El) has the function of making the chameleonmatch its background(E2) only because
M functions to produce predation avoidance (E4) by producing the
series E1-E3 (1993, 56-57).
This conception of serialfunctions, however,faces the following difficulty.SinceMdoes not functionto produceE4 directly,the only means
of identifyingthat M (ratherthan some other mechanism)functionsto
produceE4 is by identifyingthat E3 producesE4 and so on back to M's
directlyproducingEl. So it seems that we must be able to identifythat
each item in the seriesfunctions to producethe nextprior to identifying
that M functions to produce the last item in the series.A more natural
way of viewing serialfunctions, then, is as follows: M functionsto produce El, which functions to produce E2, and so on until we get to the
last item in the series;then M functionsto producethat item in virtueof
functioningto produceearlieritems in the series.
If we do view serial functions in this way, however, we cannot conclude that M functions to produce the last item in the series in virtue
of its producing earlieritems. For functionalityis not transitive.That
is, in general, it is not true that, if the function of A is to produce B
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and the function of B is to produce C, then the function of A is to
produce C. In a car engine, for example, a function of the alternator
is to keep the battery charged and the function of the chargedbattery
is to turn over the startermotor; but it is not a function of the alternator
to turn over the startermotor (for the alternatoris not even operative
until after the car has started). Thus, B may be an item that is specifiable both functionally and non-functionally. In that case, it may be
the function of A to produce B only under some non-functionalspecification,while only the functionalspecificationof B pertainsto C. The
functional individuationof A, then, would involve no referenceto the
production of C.
This allows the possibility of viewing serialfunctions in a way quite
opposed to Millikan's. According to this alternative conception, M
would have as function only to produce some proximaleffect (undera
non-functional description),which (under a functional description)in
turn would function to produce the next item in the series, and so on
until the penultimateitem would function to producethe terminalitem.
If this is the way we should view a functional series initiated by some
proximate mechanism, then that mechanism would be individualistically individuated,since its function would be only to producea proximal response.Of course, this is only a possibleway of viewingthe functions of proximatemechanismsand the series of effects they initiate. I
propose now to argue, contra Millikan, that this is the way we should
view the functions of proximatemechanisms.My argumentwill consist
in showing,in Sections3.1-3.4, that four considerationsfavorthis view.
3.1. Functionsand System Repairs.The fact that functionalityis not
transitiveis usually obscured,sincewe are usually attemptingto understand the functions of componentsin largeand complex systems,where
componentsare connectedpreciselyso as to allow theirproximaleffects
to have, in turn, far-reachingdistal effects within the system.It is often
obscuredeven more because complex systemsconsist of a hierarchyof
nestedsubsystems;thus, whicheffectwe see a componentas functioning
to producecan be an artifactof which (sub)systemwithin the hierarchy
we select as the startingpoint for functionalanalysis.This is why we are
often temptedto see the production of a distal effect as the function of
a component or to see it as having multiplefunctionscorrespondingto
its many effects within the system hierarchy.
But the function of a component in a hierarchicalsystemcan be seen
clearly only in cases of breakdownof the system in which that component is embedded. In such cases, we follow a localized diagnostic
procedureto isolate the cause of the breakdownand then performone
of two types of operation to get the system up and runningagain:We
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eitherreplaceor repaira system component or restorelost or damaged
connections among components.And when we do not fix a component
it is because, although the system as a whole has broken down, that
componenthas not stoppedperformingits function. Only a component
that requiresreplacementor repairin cases of embeddingsystembreakdown has stopped performingits function. To illustrate,if my car sputters and stalls when I press the accelerator, but diagnosis reveals a
faulty distributoror mistimed engine, the carburetordoes not require
repair,sinceit is still performingthe functionit was designedto perform
of vaporizing gasoline. Similarly,if the lights do not come on when I
flip the switch, but diagnosis reveals a bad bulb or loose connection
somewherebetweenthe switch and the light, the switchis still performing the function it was designedto perform of channeling currentto
the proper wire when open. Thus, a breakdown in the system that
contains a component does not (necessarily)involve that component's
not performingits function. These facts imply the following principle
offunctional isolation (POFI):

The function of a component is to produce the effect that it produces in all possible cases of breakdown of its embeddingsystem
in which that component does not requirerepair.
In short, if you don't fix it, it ain't broke (i.e., it's performingits function).
Millikan, however, infers the function(s) of a mechanismfrom the
effect(s) it produces in Normalconditions,where saying "that a part or
subsystem is in its 'normal conditions' is just another way of saying
that it is part of a wider intact system, that the rest of the system to
which it belongs is in place" (1993, 162). Since a breakdownin Normal
conditions thus preventsa mechanismfrom producingsome of its Normal effects, Millikan is led to take the Normal conditions in whicha
mechanism functions to be essential to its performingits function(s).
This is why Millikan says, "if no predator comes by, . . . [the] color
state of the chameleon cannotperformits proper function" (1993, 57;
emphasis added). And, since her theory holds that the function of the
color state derives from the function of the mechanismthat produces
it, her theory entails that the mechanismis also notperformingits function when it effects a color change in the absence of predators.
But, even grantingthat the widerpredationavoidancesystemis broken down when it does not currentlyresult in avoidance of a predator,
it does not follow that the color changingmechanismis not performing
its function. For, if fixing the wider predation avoidance system requires only the introduction of a predator to the scene, we are only
restoringa broken connection between the color changingmechanism
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and the distal environment.Since we are not repairingthe mechanism
itself, then, the mechanism is performingits function even in the absence of predators.Consequently,contra Millikan,the mechanismdoes
not actually function to producepredationavoidance.What then does
it function to do? It may seem, at the very least, that it functions to
make the chameleon match its backgroundenvironment.But the chameleon's color changing mechanismis under autonomic control, with
cues about ambient light wavelengths picked up directly by the chameleon's skin; blocking these cues by covering a portion of the
chameleon'sskin resultsin that portion turninguniformlypale (Young
1981, 308). Such blockage would constitute a breakdown in the
matching-the-color-of-the-backgroundsystem. We get that system
working again, however, simply by restoringthe connection between
the chameleon'sskin and the ambient light, not by repairingthe color
changing mechanismitself. The only condition in which we would repair the color changing mechanismitself (by operating on the chameleon) would be that in which the mechanism did not redistributepigments in the skin in accordance with the patterns impinging on the
surface of the skin. So, the function of the color changingmechanism
is actually to produce a proximal redistributionof pigments in accordance with proximal inputs to the chameleon'sskin.
Note that POFI does not identify the function of a mechanismvia
conditions of the mechanism'sbreakdown, but via conditions of its
embeddingsystembreakdown.Thus, it does not entail that the function
of a carburetor,say, is to produce the effect that it produces when it
does not requirerepair.A principleentailing that would engenderfallacious inferences. For example, if the carburetorrequiresrepair,the
engine may sputter;so we would be led to conclude that the function
of the carburetoris to produce a smoothly runningengine (or worse,
that its function is to suppress the sputter). POFI licenses only the
following type of inference:if the car engine is broken down, and if
the carburetordoes not requirerepairin order to fix the engine,then
the carburetoris performingits function. Further,POFI requiresthat
we focus on all possible ways in which the engine can break down
without the carburetorrequiringrepair.So, to apply POFI to the case
of the carburetor,we must:
(i) consider all possible cases of engine breakdown;
(ii) determine the type of repair requiredin each case to get the
engine running again;

(iii) ignore those cases in which the engine is fixed by (a) repairing
the carburetor or (b) repairing some part or connection the
breakdownof which resultedin the carburetor'snon-operation
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(since in these cases the carburetorwill produceno effect at all,
but due to no problem with it);
(iv) determinethe effect that the carburetorproducesin all the remaining cases.
The function of the carburetor,then, is to produce the effect that we
discover in (iv). (And, since POFI is level neutral, it could be applied
to any (sub)systemwithin a nested hierarchy,e.g., the fuel system or
the whole engine.)
This proposal differs from one made by Neander, who arguesthat,
in cases in which a mechanismgeneratesa seriesof effects, the "lowest
level" in the hierarchy of functional descriptions (the level that describes the item's "most specific" function) is the "preferred"level,
since that is the level that corresponds to a description of its "malfunctioning" (1995a, 118-120). I agree with much of Neander's argument, but thereare two significantdifferencesbetweenour approaches.
First, Neander provides no principled account of how to determine
which is the "lowestlevel" in a hierarchyof functionaldescriptionsand
thereby determine which is an item's "most specific" function. The
proposal I have offered does provide a way of isolating preciselysuch
a lowest level. Second, Neander says that "a part malfunctionswhen
it cannot perform its most specific function" (p. 120). But, if we have
no principledway of decidingwhich is an item's most specificfunction,
we have no principledway of decidingwhen it is malfunctioningeither.
So it seems that the appeal to the level at which an item is describable
as malfunctioningcannot actually succeed in informingus of which is
the "preferred"functionaldescriptionof an item. My approachavoids
this difficulty by focusing not on the breakdown of the mechanismin
order to isolate its function, but on the breakdownof the system that
embedsit: We work in toward the function of the mechanismthrough
the breakdownsof its embeddingsystem. Once we have determinedthe
mechanism'sfunction in this way, its breakdownis definedin termsof
its failure to performthat function.
It may appearthat this involves my approachin a regress.For I rely
on the breakdown of an embedding system to isolate the function of
one of its subsystems;breakdown of the subsystemis then defined as
failureto performthat function. But identifyingthe embeddingsystem
as brokendown requiresapproachingthat systemthroughbreakdowns
of its embedding system, which in turn must be identified as broken
down. The etiological theory of functions, however, provides a terminus to this regress. For, by defining functions as selected effects, the
"highestlevel" effect of a mechanismwill be an increasein fitness for
its possessor. So the regressterminatesat that systemwhose immediate
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effect is a fitnessincreasefor the possessorof the proximatemechanism.
This system will be at the highest level of the hierarchyof nested systems that embeds the mechanism,and it will include all featuresof the
environmentthat are implicatedin the fitnessincrease.It is by working
back down the hierarchyfrom this most inclusive system that we determinethe function of a proximatemechanism.
3.2. Functions and Control. Some mechanisms controlfor the degree

of their effect by suppressingthat effect once it reachessome threshold.
All mechanismswith automatic shut-off, for instance, are of this type.
The presentdiscussion,however, concernsmechanismsthat producea
series of effects; so the type of control that is of interest here is not
control for the degree of an effect, but control for the propagationof
effects along a series. That is, when a mechanismproduces a series of
effects, we can ask how far down that series the mechanismcontrols
for the production of those effects. For example, pressing the rewind
button of my VCR effects the rotation of the carriagespindle, which
effects the rotation of the tape cartridge sprocket, which effects the
rewindingof the tape. (Of course, a seriesof events mediatesthe pressing of the button and the rotation of the spindle, but ignore these for
simplicity.)How far down this series of effects does the rewindmechanism control for the production of those effects?The answeris that,
since the rewindmechanismwill not producethe rotation of the spindle
unless a tape is in the carriage,it controls for the rotation of the cartridge sprocket;but, since it will produce the rotation of the sprocket
even if the tape in the cartridgeis broken, it does not control for the
tape's actually rewinding.
The VCR rewind mechanism exhibits a familiar type of control,
which works as follows: Prior to producing one effect in a series, the
mechanism"checks"that the conditionsnecessaryfor that effect'sproducing another obtain. In other words, the mechanism does not produce an effect unless it has ensured that that effect will produce yet
another. When a mechanism exhibits this feature, in producing one
effect it is controllingfor the production of another effect. An even
greaterlevel of control is exhibited by a mechanismthat actively creates, priorto producingan effect, the conditionsnecessaryfor the propagation of that effect. We can thus define what a mechanismcontrols
for as follows. Let M be a mechanism that produces some proximal
output 0, which is the first in a series of effects of which E is an arbitrary member produced by O only through the mediation of a set of
conditions C in M's environment.Then: M controlsfor the production
of E only if, prior to producing 0, M either creates C or checks that C
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obtains. When one of these conditions is satisfied, M's production of
O ensures the production of E.
Note that C, here, is not a set of conditions necessary for the operation of M, but is a set of conditions necessary for one effect of M's to
produce another. The VCR's rewind mechanism will not operate if the
VCR is not plugged in; so, if C were taken to include the conditions
necessary for the operation of the rewind mechanism, the conclusion
would be that the mechanism does not control for any effect at all,
since it neither plugs in the VCR nor checks to make sure it is plugged
in. And, since the overwhelming majority of mechanisms do not create
or check for the conditions of their own operation, the conclusion would
be that the overwhelming majority of mechanisms control for no effect
whatsoever. In the case of the VCR, C would include instead the tape's
being in the carriage, since that is the condition necessary for the spindle's rotation to produce the cartridge sprocket's rotation. The reason,
of course, for restricting C in this way is that we want to know which of
a mechanism's many effects it controls for in its operations-that is,
when it actually produces some effect.
This notion of what a mechanism controls for explains many of our
intuitive judgments about the function of a mechanism. For example,
why don't we see it as the function of the carburetor to rotate the car's
wheels? Because the carburetor does not "control for" the rotation of
the car's wheels; that is, it neither checks that the car is in gear nor puts
it in gear prior to vaporizing the gasoline. Why don't we see it as the
function of the light switch to illuminate the room? Because the light
switch neither checks to make sure a bulb is in the socket nor puts one
in it prior to diverting current. Since issues of control are never explicit
in our reasoning about functions, however, it is not appreciated that
what a mechanism controls for is evidence of its function. To illustrate,
consider again Millikan's claim that the function of the chameleon's
color changing mechanism is predation avoidance. Since the color
changing mechanism does not check for the presence of a predator
prior to effecting a color change the mechanism does not control for
predation avoidance. In addition, given the results when the chameleon's skin is covered, it is clear that the color changing mechanism
does not even check for the conditions beyond the surface of the chameleon's skin prior to effecting a color change. What the mechanism
actually controls for, then, is just the proximal distribution of pigments
in the chameleon's skin. And this indicates that the function of the
mechanism is only to produce that proximal output, since that is all it
controls for.
This conclusion works together with that of the last section to support a wholly individualistic individuation of the color changing mech-
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anism, since they (independently)support viewing its function as the
production of a proximal color change. Of course, underNormal conditions, the color change producedby the mechanismis correlatedwith
the coloring of the chameleon's background and this (sometimes)effects predation avoidance. So, under this interpretation,the chameleon's color-changing behavior itself performs a non-individualistic
function (as part of a functional series). Recall the discussion of the
non-transitivityof functionality. The case of the chameleon is one in
which the color changing behavioris specifiableboth functionallyand
non-functionally;the mechanism functions to produce that behavior
under a non-functional description, while the behavior functions to
produce a further effect only under its functional specification.The
non-functional description of the color-changing behavior happens
also to be individualistic,while the functional specificationof that behavior happensalso to be non-individualistic.This interpretation,however, is still fully consistent with an adaptationistaccount of the chameleon's color-changing mechanism. Under this interpretation,the
mechanism was selected for because of the individualisticfunction it
performs;for when it performs the function of changing the chameleon's color, the changed color benefitsthe chameleonby (sometimes)
furthereffecting predation avoidance.
3.3. Behavioral Strategies and Fitness. There may, however, be a

sense that the above parenthetical"sometimes"conceals the real issue.
This sense would derive from the fact that the function of a proximate
mechanismis the production of that effect because of which the mechanism was selected, together with Millikan's idea that the only effect
of the chameleon'sproximatemechanismthat confers a benefiton the
chameleon is that of actually avoiding predators. But Millikan's way of

calculating benefits is not mandatory. Implicit in Millikan's theory is
what I will call a distributivemethod of calculating benefits. This involves grouping all the occasions on which a mechanismM produces
a behavior B and then individuallyexaminingthe Bs. When the Bs are
examinedindividually,it is noticed that some confer no actual benefit
while others do, where the differenceis that (respectively)betweennot
producing and producing a beneficialeffect E. Since M would be selected for only if it confers a benefit on its possessor, it is concluded
that it must be the function of M to produce E, rather than B alone,
because it is only when B produces E that any benefit is actually conferredon the possessor of M.
But there is another way to calculate benefits, which I will call the
collectivemethod.Rather than comparing the distributivebenefitsassociated (or not) with individualbehaviors,this method comparesthe
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benefit levels of competing behavioralstrategies. So rather than comparing the benefitsassociatedwith individualB productions,it looks at
the overall benefit that accrues to a strategy of B-production. Where the

distributivemethod asks "When does an individual that produces B
therebybenefit?",the collective method asks "Does an individualthat
employs a strategyof producingB enjoy an overallgreaterbenefitthan
an individualthat employs an alternativestrategy?"If the answeris yes,
the collective method predictsthat the mechanismresponsiblefor producing B will be selectedfor.
To clarify the differencebetween these methods of calculatingbenefits, consider investment strategies.Suppose I instruct my accountant
to follow a strategy of investing in everythingDonald Trump invests
in, but to spareme details about whereindividualinvestmentsaremade
or whether they pay off; and suppose my net worth consequentlyincreases. The distributivemethod would look at my financial records
and say, "Here your strategy benefitedyou and here it did not." The
point, however, is not each individualinvestmentand whetherit paid
off, but that my strategy of investmentincreasedmy net worth (read:
financial fitness) and did so even though I had no information regarding

the individualinvestments.Indeed, if I am a wise investor, I will adopt
whatever investment strategy will maximize my net worth. And, in
choosing among competing strategies,I can ignore the success or failure rate of the individual investmentsunder each strategy, and focus
only on the impact of each strategy on my net worth.
Returning to the chameleon'sproximate mechanism,the collective
method would say that the behavioral strategy of producing a color
change has a greateroverall benefit associated with it than competing
strategies, regardless of whether (or how often) it effects predation
avoidance on individual occasions. So what actually benefits the chameleon is the strategy of changing color. The collective method thus

rendersthe same judgment as the distributivemethod about the contribution of the proximate mechanism to the chameleon's overall fitness. But the collective method enjoys two advantagesover the distributive method. First, its benefit calculations are made at a level of
behavioral description that is consistent with independentevidence
(from Sections 3.1 and 3.2) of the functions of proximatemechanisms,
whereas the distributivemethod infers those functionsfrom benefits
and is inconsistent with the evidence of Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Second,
only the collectivemethod accordswith the focus in evolutionarygame
theory on modeling behavioral strategies, rather than individual behaviors and their effects (or lack thereof) in situ (see, e.g., Dawkins
1989, Maynard Smith 1982).
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3.4. Functions and Explanatory Asymmetry. There is, perhaps, still

a sense that one must go distributivein order to account for why a
strategy is beneficial-that the chameleon's strategy of producing
a color change, for example, is beneficial only because on certain
individual occasions it effects predation avoidance. This sense would
derive from the idea that the function of a proximatemechanismcannot be understoodin the absence of informationabout the function of
the behaviorthat the mechanism produces. But now we should ask:
What explanatoryfunction is served by talk of "the function of a behavior"?
Consider a hypothetical population of chameleons that are anatomically and physiologicallyidenticalto actual chameleonsand, consequently, also change color to match their backgrounds. These hypothetical chameleons fortunately have no predators in their
environment;but, unfortunately,the creatureson which they prey are
a scarce and cautious lot, alighting nearby only when a chameleon is
camouflaged. So the color-changing behavior of these hypothetical
chameleons aids in luring prey, rather than avoiding predators. The
considerations I have urged so far entail that the proximate mechanisms in both types of chameleonhave the same singlefunction of producing color-changingbehavior, the differencebetweenthem concerning only the function of the behaviorproducedby the mechanisms.
Focusing now on the functions of the color-changingbehavior in
both types of chameleon, we can see that the explanatoryrole of referenceto the function of the behavioris actuallythat of explainingwhy
that behavioris beneficialand that, in turn, explainswhythe proximate
mechanismproducingthatbehaviorwas selected.Thus, sayingthat the
function of the color-changing behavior is predation avoidance is
equivalent to saying that Nature favored chameleons possessing a
proximate mechanism with the function of producing a color change by

allowing fewer of them to be eaten. Similarly,saying that the (hypothetical)function of that behavioris prey luringis equivalentto saying
that (hypothetical)Nature favored chameleonspossessinga proximate
mechanismwith that function by allowingfewerof them to starve.Talk
of the function of the behavior produced by a proximatemechanism,
then, is equivalentto talk of why a mechanismthat functions to produce that behaviorwas selectedfor. But talk of a mechanism'sfunction
(of producing some behavior) is not equivalent to talk of why some
other property of the organism was selected for. Consequently,there
is an explanatoryasymmetrybetween talk of the function of a proximate mechanism and talk of the function of a behavior:The latter is
equivalentto talk of why the formerwas selectedfor. Given this asymmetry, there is no reason to expect that "the function" of a behavior
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would "reflect back into" the function of the proximate mechanism
that producesit.
Note that this is not claiming that there is a single level at which it
is legitimate to explain the selection of a proximatemechanism.Consequently, it is compatible with Goode and Griffiths'demonstration
that "thereare severallevels of theory in evolutionarybiology," since
"[s]electionprocesses can be describedat more or less abstract theoretical levels" (1995, 107), where these theoreticallevels correspondto
the levels in the series of effects producedby a proximatemechanism.
Goode and Griffiths,however,infer from this that all such levels "generate genuine, complementarydescriptionsof etiological function"(p.
107). This inferencegoes throughonly given the supposition,for which
Goode and Griffithsdo not argue, that every level at which a selection
process can be described as acting on a proximate mechanismcorresponds to a level of functional descriptionof that mechanism.The reason they do not argue for this claim is that it appearssimply to be the
etiological theory of functions-that the function of a mechanismis to
produce an effect that it was selectedfor producing.But the preceding
argumentsshow that, while the etiological theory capturesthe core of
a theory of the functions of biological items, by itself it is insufficient;
rather,a complete theory of functions must conjoin the etiologicaltheory with the considerationsof the last four sections.
3.5. "AnimalMagnetism"(or. The Philosopher'sLodestone). Considernow a focused applicationof the precedingargumentsto a muchdiscussed case. A typical anaerobic aquatic bacteriumhas in its cell a
chain of approximatelytwenty particles of magnetite, called "magnetosomes." This magnetosome chain is in fixed position within the cell
and alignedwith the flagellumon the cell's exterior.The chain behaves
as a compass needle that, in an aquatic environment,moves freely in
both horizontal and verticalplanes. In bacteriain the Northern Hemisphere the magnetosome chain is north-seeking,pointing north and
downward (with the angle of inclination increasingas it moves closer
to geomagneticNorth); the flagellumthus propels the cell in the direction of geomagneticNorth. This mechanismis an obvious adaptation;
for, in the Northern Hemisphere,aquatic movement toward geomagnetic North is also downwardmovement toward deoxygenatedwater.
Thus, such "compassneedles"have been selectedfor becausethey steer
anaerobicbacteriato deoxygenatedwater. This hypothesisis also supported by the fact that aquatic bacteria in the Southern Hemisphere
contain reversedpolarity, south-seeking"compassneedles,"whichorient them toward geomagneticSouth and, hence, downwardtowarddeoxygenatedwater (see Blakemore& Frankel 1981).
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Dretske claims that the magnetosome chain functions to indicate,
but that it is indeterminateas to whether it indicates deoxygenated
water, geomagneticNorth, or merely magnetic North (1988, 63 n. 6).
Millikan similarly views the magnetosome chain as representational,
but claims that what it represents"is univocal; it representsonly the
direction of oxygen-freewater," since it is only movement toward deoxygenated water that benefits the bacterium, not simply movement
toward (geo)magneticNorth (1993, 93). I will bypass issues about what
the magnetosome chain indicates or represents(if anything)and focus
only on its function in the behavioraleconomy of the bacterium.For,
since both Dretske and Millikan fix the representationalcontent of the
chain from its function in the bacterium'sbehavioraleconomy, a specificationof that function is priorto a specificationof what it represents;
so it is possible to focus on that function independentlyof issues about
representation.The positions of Dretske and Millikan are interesting
here because they correspondto viewing the chain as functionallyindeterminate(producingorientation toward magnetic North, geomagnetic North, or deoxygenated water) or as determinatelyfunctioning
to orient the bacterium toward deoxygenated water. But neither of
these positions is correct.
To see why, we should focus not only on cases in which everything
goes swimmingly,but also on cases of breakdownof the widest system
embeddingthe mechanism.When we do, we find a couple notable phenomena. First, hemispheric displacement of a bacterium has fatal
results. For example, a Northern bacterium transplanted into the
Southern Hemisphereswims upward into oxygenated water and dies,
since in the SouthernHemisphereits north-seekingmagnetosomechain
orients it upward. Second, even in its home hemisphere,a bacterium
can be made to swim toward oxygenatedwater simplyby passinga bar
magnet overhead.
When breakdownslike these occur, we get the widest systemup and
running again simply by restoring a broken connection between the
magnetosomechain and the widerenvironment.Sincewe do not repair
the magnetosomechain itself, the magnetosomechain is performingits
function even when that does not effect orientationtoward deoxygenated water (first breakdown) or geomagnetic North (second breakdown). Indeed, the only breakdownin which we would repairthe magnetosome chain itself is one in which it has become depolarized;and
the effect that it produces in all cases but this is that of orienting the
bacterium toward magnetic attraction. In addition, as both types of
breakdown show, the magnetosome chain does not control for orientation toward either deoxygenated water or geomagnetic North; the
only output the chain actually controls for is orientationtoward mag-
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netic attraction. These facts conjointly imply that the function of the
magnetosome chain is only to orient the bacteriumtoward magnetic
attraction. But even this is too general. For there may be more than
one source of magnetic attractionin the environment.How would we
specifythe relevantattraction?We could attemptto do so by describing
the field gradient at some arbitrary(yet small) distance D from the
surface of the bacterium'scell. But this will pinpoint the relevant attraction only if the field gradient at the surface of the cell is the
same-only if there is no disturbancebetweenD and the cell's surface.
So the relevant attraction is actually the one that impinges most
strongly on the surface of the cell. Thus, the magnetosome chain has
the single, determinatefunction of orientingthe bacteriumtoward the
strongestmagneticattractionimpingingon the surfaceof its cell. Since
this is a proximal output, we have arrived at a wholly individualistic
functional individuationof the mechanism.This individualisticmechanism does, however, serve to increase the fitness of its possessors by
functioning to initiate a series of effects that (usually) culminates in
movement toward deoxygenated water. And information about the
function of its outputexplains why the mechanismwith that individualistic function was selectedfor.
4. Conclusion.If these argumentsare right, then evolution by natural
selection "designs"proximate mechanismsin accordancewith a principle of cognitive economy that Clark calls "the 007 principle." As
Clark puts it:
evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in
costly ways when they can use the structureof the environment
and their operations upon it [instead].... That is, know only as
much as you need to know to get the job done. (1989, 64)
It is easy to see why natural selection would have employed this principle. In the case of the chameleon, controlling for changing color if
(and only if) a predator is present would be no more effective than
simplychangingcolor without firstcheckingfor the presenceof a predator. Indeed, in general, a mechanism that controlled for distal conditions of the environmentwould be costlier to "build"than one that
controls for only proximal conditions. And, since Normal conditions
provide correlationsbetween the distal conditions of the environment
and the proximal conditions of a proximate mechanism,the costs involved in "building"such a mechanism would outweigh the payoffs.
So naturalselectionfinds it most cost effectiveto "design"mechanisms
that control for ("know about") only proximal inputs and outputs.
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The mechanisms need do no more than that, for Normal conditions
do the rest.
These conclusions are drawn,however, only about mechanismsthat
have become fixed as a result of evolution by naturalselection. Some
theories(e.g., the "neuralDarwinism"of Edelman 1992)maintainthat
many brain mechanisms become fixed as a result of neural selection
during an individual'shistory.These types of mechanism,for all I have
argued, may always require non-individualisticfunctional individuation. My argumentshave shown to be functionallyindividualisticonly
those mechanisms present in individuals of a current population because they conferred adaptive advantage at some point in the evolutionary history of a species. These are the only mechanismsof which
evolutionarypsychology provides explanations.Thus, insofar as there
are behavior control mechanismsthat are functionally non-individualistic, explaining their functioning devolves to other research programs in psychology.
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